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毕业论文外文翻译

外文翻译之一

Corporate governance and firm valuation – the case of China

Ohannes George Paskelian,??Stephen Bell

Corporate Ownership and Control, 2009, Vol.7

Abstract

We examine the determinants and implications of Chinese corporate cash holdings in the 1993- 2006 period. Agency theories assert that firms with a large controlling shareholder have relatively large cash holdings because of the greater ability of the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits from the cash holdings. Our findings show a very strong inverse relationship between cash holdings and firm valuation in high government ownership firms. Also, we find that in firms with high government ownership, dividend payouts are highly valued. We conclude that Chinese investors see government ownership as a factor that reduces firm value. They prefer relatively higher dividends from firms having high government ownership. Conversely, investors assign much higher value to firms with relatively low government ownership and they tend to be neutral about the dividends payouts of such firms. Also, investors value highly the presence of foreign investors in Chinese firms and tend to be neutral about dividend payouts of firms with high foreign ownership concentration.

Keywords: Cash Holdings, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, Chinese Firms, Dividend Policy, Government Ownership

Introduction

The cash holding decision is a prominent theme in the agency relationships between shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1986). According to the agency theory, controlling shareholders should focus on increasing shareholders‘ wealth rather than taking advantage of the minority shareholders. However, when corporate governance circumstances are poor within a firm, controlling shareholders can derive substantial private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2003).

There are restively few accurate estimates of the magnitude of private benefits obtained by controlling shareholders. All of the evidence concerning this point is indirect and is based on the assumption that minority shareholders are better protected when private benefits of control are curbed and financial development is enhanced (La Porta et al., 1997)

Liquid assets can be converted into private benefits at lower cost than other assets, since it will be easy to use cash in non-value enhancing ways (Myers and Rajan, 1998). It stands to reason that controlling shareholders would tend to overinvest in liquid assets (Dittmar et al., 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2004 and Pinkowitz et al., 2006). If controlling shareholders do not maximize firm value and hold more liquid assets in countries in which it is easier to appropriate such private benefits, then minority shareholders should value liquid assets in those countries less than they do in countries where it is more difficult for controlling shareholders to do so (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). If investors discount the value of cash holdings because they expect controlling shareholders to partly consume such holdings as private benefits, then they value dividends in that country at a premium (Pinkowitz et al., 2006).

Ownership of most listed companies in China is heavily concentrated in government hands (Xu and Wang, 1999). The Chinese government is usually the controlling shareholder. Thus, being a large majority shareholder in Chinese firms, the government can use its controlling position to dictate its own agenda on firm‘s managers. Cash holdings in Chinese firms become a very important factor for the future profitability of the firm, since Chinese financial regulations require that firms raising capital from outside sources (mainly by issuing new stock) need to maintain a certain level of return on equity (ROE) over the past three year period (Wang et al., 2006), it would be easier for the firm to invest its own cash in profitable projects without requiring to raise new capital by selling new stock. However, cash can be used also to serve the needs of the controlling shareholder in non-value enhancing manners for thefirm; examples include over-employment, acquisition of other firms for no reasons, investment in non-profitable assets, etc.

In this paper, we investigate 1) how agency problems affect the level of cash holdings in listed Chinese companies; 2) The effect of Chinese corporate governance, in particular the presence of majority government ownership, on investor valuation of cash and dividends. To measure agency problems, we use multiple governance measures of ownership concentration (managerial ownership, government ownership, institutional holdings, and percentage of foreign shareholders). In addition, we investigate the impact of Chinese ROE regulatory requirement on cash holdings of Chinese firms.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is the literature review of previous studies related to equity offerings. Section 3 discusses the regulatory characteristics of the Chinese market. Section 4 covers the empirical hypotheses to be tested in the paper. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper.

Conclusions

In this paper, we examine factors affecting the cash holdings of Chinese firms. We also examine the effect of the Chinese government in its role as majority stockholder, on private benefit extraction in firms it controls and the effect such extraction has on firm valuation. We test three main hypotheses. First, minority shareholders value cash holdings less in high government ownership firms. Second, high government ownership negatively affects the firm value. Third, minority shareholders value dividends more in high government ownership firms. In order to test for robustness, we also employed the foreign investor concentration variable in testing hypothesis 3. All three hypotheses are grounded in agency theories that state that controlling shareholders will extract more private benefits from firms they control if investor protection is weak. Our results strongly support all three hypotheses. We find that high government ownership negatively affects firm value. Investors discount the value of cash holdings in high government ownership firms and prefer instead to receive larger dividend payouts from those firms. Conversely, investors assign higher value to cash holdings in low government ownership firms and do not prefer large dividend payouts when compared to high government ownership firms. We also find similar effect for the presence of foreign ownership concentration in Chinese firms. Investors discount the value of cash holdings firms with low foreign ownership concentration and instead prefer to receive larger dividend payouts from those firms. Conversely, investors assign higher value to cash holdings in high foreign ownership concentrated firms and do not prefer larger dividends when compared to low foreign ownership concentrated firms.

Overall, our results indicate a strong inverse relationship between firm value and government ownership concentration in Chinese firms. Also, our results indicate that investors do not think that the presence of large cash holdings in high government concentrated firms will have positive impact on the firm‘s future profitability, thus they require higher dividend payouts from such firms. Our paper sheds light on one of the most important aspects of corporate governance i.e. the impact of government ownership on firm valuation and its effect on minority shareholders.

公司治理与企业价值评估——以中国为例

奥汉内斯·乔治·帕斯卡利安，斯蒂芬·贝尔

公司所有权和控制权，2009年，第7卷

摘要：本文考察了1993-2006年中国企业现金持有量的决定因素及其影响。代理理论认为，拥有大股***拥有相对较大的现金持有量，因为大股东有更大的能力从现金持有中获取私人利益。我们的研究结果显示，在高某某***中，现金持有***估值之间存在非常强的反向关系。同时，我们发现，在政府持股比例较***中，派息的价值也较高。我们的结论是，中国投资者认为政府所有权是***价值的一个因素。他们更倾向于从拥有高某某所有***获得相对较高的股息。相反，投资者将更高的价值分配给政府所有权相对较***，他们倾向于对***的股息支付保持中立。此外，投资者高度重视外国投资者在中国企业中的存在，对外国股权高度集中的企业的股息支付往往持中立态度。

关键词：现金持有、股权结构、公司治理、***、股利政策、政府所有权

一、介绍

现金持有决策是股东与经理人代理关系中的一个突出主题（Jensen，19 内容过长，仅展示头部和尾部部分文字预览，全文请查看图片预览。 索赔权。这就是自由放任的拨款机制。一个法人承担输入责任-K和-L，因此对生产的输出拥有不可分割的权利要求，因此，总而言之，一个法人因此合法地占有整个产品（Q，–K，–L）。所有这一切都是对在确定剩余求偿权的基础上，在积极和消极的产权层面上正在发生的事情的描述。如果产出、资本服务和劳务的单价分别为p、r和w，那么整个产品的价值就是剩余价值或利润：π=pQ–rK–wL。

因此，剩余索赔的合同确定是对整个产品的拨款的合同确定在收入和费用水平上的反映。很难将这种对挪用的处理与传统文献进行比较，因为这些文献甚至都没有提出这个问题。

例如，在Putterman和Kroszner[1996]***“经济”性质的论文选集中，没有一篇论文在***时提出拨款问题。在“产权经济学”【如Furubotn和Pejovich 1974年】***的所谓“产权法”【如Hart和Moore 1990年；Hart 1995年】中，公司的拨款问题同样被忽视。

因此，传统的文献并没有超越“企业所有权”这一基本的神话术语，去理解企业的积极和消极结果（以生产载体或整个产品为代表）是以合同事实模式所决定的方式合法占有的。

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