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THE ACT OF THINKING DEREK MELSER The Act of Thinking The Act of Thinking Derek Melser A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England © 2004 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. Set in Stone sans and Stone serif by The MIT Press. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Melser, Derek. The act of thinking / Derek Melser. p. cm. “A Bradford book.” Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-262-13446-2 (alk. paper) 1. Thought and thinking. 2. Act (Philosophy). I. Title. B105.T56M45 2004 128'.3—dc22 ***79 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 to Helen Contents Foreword xi Acknowledgements xv Introduction: Is Thinking a Natural Process, or Is It an Action? 1 Cognitive Science 2 The Possibility of an Actional Account of Thinking 4 Natural Processes vs. Personal Actions 4 Initial Indications That Thinking Is an Action 6 The Argument of This Book 12 1 Action-Based Theories of Thinking (1) 17 Behaviorism 17 Behavior-Abbreviation Theories 21 Ryle’s Adverbial Theory 28 2 Action-Based Theories of Thinking (2) 35 Ryle’s Refraining Theory 35 Vygotsky: Internalisation of Speech-Mediated Social Activity 42 Hampshire’s “Inhibited Display” Theory of Emotion 47 Other “Internalized Social Activity” Theories 51 3 Concerted Activity 55 Defining Concerting 57 Infants’ Innate Abilities 58 First Concertings 61 Educative Concerting 64 Vocalizing and Speech in Educative Concerting 68 The Matrix 72 viii Contents 4 The Tokening of Concerted Activity 75 Tokening Done to Initiate Concerted Activity 76 Speech Replaces Other Types of Tokening 78 Covert Tokening 81 The Mechanics of Covert Tokening 82 The Uses of Covert Tokening 85 How Covert Tokening Is Taught 87 The Notion of “Expressing” Thoughts and Feelings 93 5 Derivation of Solo Action from Concerting 95 The Developmental and Logical Roots of Solo Action 95 Early Solitary Action 98 Empathy 100 Hortation 102 Cooperation 104 Autonomous Solitary Action 106 What Is Learned before What 107 6 Concerted Perceiving and the Tokening of It 109 Perceiving Is a Kind of Doing 109 Learning New Perceptual Behavior 112 Things in the World 118 Referring 122 Absent-Referent Referring 125 Solo Perceiving, Solo Imagining, and Consciousness 131 7 Thinking 137 Paradigmatic Self-Educative Thinking 137 Second-Order Tokening 140 Other Varieties of Thinking 144 Ways in Which Thinking Is Public 148 Is Thinking Observable? 149 8 Where Our Notion of the Mind Comes From (1) 157 Theory Theory 158 The Colloquial Vocabulary for Talking about Thinking 164 Using Metaphor to Refer to Features of Things 166 Dead Metaphors 171 Galvanic Stirrings 173 Contents ix 9 Where Our Notion of the Mind Comes From (2) 179 The Conventional Wisdom about Metaphors and Mind 179 The Metaphorical-Origin Theory 181 Exclusive Use 182 Precedents in Metaphors 184 No Concept 187 Nominalization 188 10 Literal Paraphrases of the Mind Metaphors 199 Internality, Privacy, and Introspectability 200 Agency 205 Intentionality 208 Non-Physicality 211 Other Metaphors in the Colloquial Thinking Vocabulary 212 Why We Depend on Metaphors for Talking about Thinking 215 Mistaking Empathizing for Imagined Perceiving 217 11 Our Knowledge of Actions 221 The Empathy Argument 222 Action Metaphors in Science 228 The Rhetoric of Action Physicalism 233 Cultural Determinants of Actions 238 Verbs and Actions and Things 242 Is Knowledge of Actions Epistemologically Primary? 247 Appendix: A Sample of Mind Metaphors 251 Notes and Citations 259 Bibliography 273 Index 283 Foreword Aims The main aim of this book is to present a new theory about the nature of thinking. I mean thinking in a broad sense that includes most of the various “mental phenomena.” The theory equates thinking with the covert “token performance” or “tokening” of actions of one kind or another. The covert tokening of actions is identified as itself a species of action. As well as being intended as a contribution to the philosophy of mind, the book aims to contribute to a larger project that I mention only in this foreword and at the end of the book. The larger project is to establish actions as a legitimate philosophical given. The claim here is that the concept of “something one does” is self-sufficient and sui generis. Our knowledge of actions need not be, nor can it be, justified or explained by knowledge of any other kind. Actions are philosophical hard currency in themselves. The conventional assumption is that the concept of an action includes and presupposes concepts of mental phenomena—beliefs, desires, decisions, intentions, volitions, etc.—and that these latter are concepts of a fundamentally non-actional kind. If the theory in this book is right, the conventional assumption is mistaken and mental concepts are really actional concepts. If this is so, then, in specifying the thinking that leads to and/or accompanies actions, one is not specifying the action plus some other kind of phenomenon, rather, one is specifying a more complex kind of action, or specifying an action plus some ancillary actions. In this case, the claim that actions are a basic philosophical “given” would no longer be vulnerable to the fact that actions often, or always, involve thinking. xii Foreword In order to perform any action, the agent must (among other things) perceive things in the world that are relevant to that action—that is, the action’s patient, venue, instrument, product, goal state, etc. It is assumed that perception is an impersonal natural process—something that happens to a person, more than an action the person performs. Thus, the agent’s perceivings of relevant things would introduce another necessary but non-actional element into actions, also jeopardizing actions’ ontological independence. However, if it can be shown that perceiving is not a natural (say, physiological) process but a form of personal action, then the “actions as given” thesis would be defensible here too. My attempt in chapter 6 to show that perceiving is an action may be too brief to convince. Even so, I thought it worth indicating how this might be argued. Actions do have an essential perceptual component, but in my view this perceptual component is itself actional and not an impersonal process. Thus, the actional status of actions is not compromised by their perceptual component. It is widely assumed that actions must, like everything else in the world, be in-principle specifiable in objective, scientific terms. It is assumed that scientific descriptions of actions would primarily concern macro- and micro-physiological events but would also encompass complex causal interaction between external objects and these physiological events. The physiological events believed to underpin actions are thought to include perceptual and mental (brain) events as well as muscular ones. In opposing this assumption, proponents of the “actions as given” view could agree that, if actions are real things in the world, they must be scientifically describable. However, while continuing to assert the reality of actions, they could claim that actions are not “things in the world” in the required sense. And they could claim that actions are not explicable in physiological terms. I argue both of these claims, albeit briefly, in chapter 11. The question of the possibility of scientific analysis of people’s actions is as large and controversy-fraught as the questions about the nature and relation to action of thinking (or “mental phenomena”) and perception. To establish that actions are sui generis would require addressing all three questions at length. In this book, I devote a chapter each to the questions relating to perception and scientific explanation of 内容过长，仅展示头部和尾部部分文字预览，全文请查看图片预览。 149 overt vs. covert, 81–84, 87, 90–93, 141–144, 202, 208, 212, 213 second-order, 140–144 Toolan, M., 213 Trevarthen, C., 63, 64 Valsiner, J., 210 Verbs vs. nouns, 242, 245–247 imperative use, 243, 244 reportive and referential use, 243, 244, 246 Verstehen, 224, 247 Vico, G., 247, 248 Visualizing, 14, 129, 147, 176, 179, 218 Vygotsky, L. S., 42–52, 122, 140, 146 Walton, K. L., 92 Washburn, M. F., 24 Watson caveat, 152, 155 Watson, J. B., 19, 21, 22 Wittgenstein, L., 21, 49, 80, 177, 217, 242 [文章尾部最后500字内容到此结束,中间部分内容请查看底下的图片预览]请点击下方选择您需要的文档下载。

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